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Introduction 
This thesis will examine the factors that influenced New Zealand"s military aircraft 
purchasing decisions between 1957 and 1981 . This larger question gives rise to two lines 
of enquiry. Firstly, why did the New Zealand Government chose to equip particular roles? 
Secondly, why were the various aircraft types then chosen to fulfill these roles? This period 
encompasses the purchase of the Canberra, which was a significant episode in the history of 
the RNZAF's combat wing. It also includes the crucial re-equipment programme of the 
1960s. The period ends with the purchase of the 727s, which was part of the adaptation to 
new defence commitments 
While a number of authors have commented on individual purchasing decisions, some 
have considered broader issues involved in military aircraft purchases. Foremost amongst 
these was David Filer, whose work dealt with the RNZAF during the period from 1946 to 
1972. He stated that the most significant deveiopment in the RNZAF during the 1946-Tl 
period was the selection the United States as a source of new aircraft. 1 This was in contrast 
to the early post-war period when New Zealand had chosen to purchase from Britain. He 
suggested that the change towards American purchases was part of the Air Force' s response 
to the general defence trend in the period away from ties ,¥ith the United Kingdom and 
towards ties with the United States and Australia. 2 However, he acknowledged American 
dominance in military aircraft production and their willingness to provide credit facilities. 
Filer concluded that the RNZAF was altered more by this move from defence ties with 
Britain towards ties with the United States and Australia than by the switch from 
commitments in the Middle East to South-East Asia. 3 
Filer emphasises the importance of budgetary constraints, claiming that finance has 
often been the overriding factor in procurement decisions and has led to many deferrals of 
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equipment purchases. 4 This concern has meant that although the RNZAF has 
acknowledged the benefits of common equipment, Australian-produced planes have cost too 
much in comparison to their competitors and have not been chosen.5 To reduce 
expenditure and financial risk, two factors have dominated in the type of military aircraft 
New Zealand has chosen: they have been relatively cheap and they have had a proven 
service record.6 
Rolfe identified a desire to standardise equipment with Australian, noting that "For at 
least 40 years, there have been tentative moves to co-operate with Australia in defence 
supply ... Little was achieved. '7 Rolfe, like Filer, mentions the Services' preference for 
proven types8, and points out that New Zealand acquisition projects often involve the 
purchase of second-hand equipment which becomes available at short notice. 9 
Three main sources were used to answer the questions posed and to test the arguments 
advanced by previous authors. Firstly, there were files from the National Archives, 
including Cabinet, Treasury and RNZAF documents. Some material reiating to the 
replacement of the Canberra was obtained from HQNZDF. The Alexander Tumbuil 
Library provided files relating to the sale of New Zealand-buiit aircraft. Secondly, the 
repons of the Service boards, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Exiernal Affairs were 
researched. Lastly, Newspapers, particularly the Christchurch Press, and Hansard were 
consulted. 
This thesis agrees with Filer that the choice of roles for the RNZAF was affected by 
financial limitations. These concerns were particularly important in determining the 
RNZAF' s specific combat role. However, while the Government was keen to restrict 
defence spending, it was willing to purchase the best aircraft available to fulfill the roles it 
had chosen for the RNZAF. Trade concerns and the desire to standardise with allies, 
particularly Australia were evident, but not over-riding. This thesis will argue against the 
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view that the of purchase American-built aircraft was part of a move away from defence ties 
with the United Kingdom. New Zealand still had close defence links with Great Britain in 
the 1960s, which was the most important period in terms of aircraft purchases. However, 
the decline of the British aviation industry meant that suitable British-built alternatives were 
not available for consideration. On the other hand, the United States was producing the 
best aircraft in the West. The result was that the United Kingdom joined New Zealand, 
Australia and numerous other countries in purchasing American aircraft. Australia's 
aircraft were not only expensive, but did not meet New Zealand requirements or match the 
performance of contending types. 
The most significant change in the RNZAF was not the shift to the United States as a 
source of aircraft; it was the switch in emphasis from the combat roles it favoured to 
providing support for the Army. While in the 1960s the Government was not wi iling to 
equip the RNZAF to participate in its preferred combat roles, it did purchase aircraft 
suitable to support the Army in South East Asia. This was significant, because as Filer 
pointed out, the prestige of combat aircraft was important to the RNZAFs identity, morale 
and ability to attract recruits. The emphasis on the RNZAF·s support functions continued 
after the end of forward defence. In fact the requirement for air transport grew as New 
Zealand's defence commitments shifted closer to home. 
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Chapter One 
The Canberra and the Light Bomber Role. 
The Canberra bomber was New Zealand's iast major mihtary aircraft acquisition of the 
1950s. It was also the last British-made aircraft purchased before the RNZAF began to buy 
from the United States. A number of commentators have sought to explain the decision to 
purchase the Canberras. They have generally seen it as the result of a deliberate change of 
roles in the 1950s. Wright noted that in 1947 planning for the RNZAF inciuded a long-
range bombing capability,1 but he claimed that the selection of the Canberra bomber to 
replace the Vampire fighter/bomber was influenced by Britain's 1957 Defence White Paper. 
That review had ruled out new fighters for the RAF, and Australia and New Zealand 
followed this general lead.2 The RNZAF's combat role changed from day fighterl&rround 
attack to light bomberiinterdiction and the Canberras were obtained accordingly. 
Ewing and Macpherson mentioned that by 1948 planning for the post-war RNZAF 
provided for two bomber/reconnaissance squadrons and one fighter squadron. 3 The 
RNZAF was finally able to purchase bomber aircraft when spending cuts elsewhere in the 
service made funding available.4 
Lockstone stated that the Canberra was obtained to meet the RNZAFs requirement for a 
tactical bombing and interdiction capability. 5 He noted that while Australia was also 
producing the Canberra, British-made aircraft were favoured for their lower cost. The 
decision was also influenced by the fact that No 75 Squadron in Malaya was equipped with 
Canberras hired from the RAF. 
Filer suggested some rather different motives for the purchase. He maintained that the 
delay in ordering a replacement for the Vampire was caused in part by the switch from 
Middle Eastern to South East Asian commitrnents.6 This led the Government to re-evaluate 
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the RNZAFs requirements before selecting a new aircraft. Filer believed that the RNZAF 
had chosen the Canberra to replace the Vampire and then adapted the combat role to suit. 
He claimed that the RNZAF favoured strike aircraft for reasons of prestige, even though the 
bomber role would be less important in South East Asia than close air support.7 The 
Canberra was also preferred as it was a proven and relatively cheap aircraft that was in 
service with New Zealand's allies. However, the Government's wish to restrict expenditure 
deiayed a decision to order aircraft until 1957. 
This chapter will argue the RNZAF had actually planned to operate Canberras alongside 
its Vampires in the early 1950s. Financial constraints delayed the purchase to such an 
extent that the Canberra· s introduction to service coincided with the obsolescence of the 
RNZAFs fighters. By that time the Air Force had recommended a change from the day 
fighteri!:,rround attack roie to a light bomber force. It will also argue that the choice of the 
Canberra was not affected by the shift to commitments in South East Asia as the Canberra 
was favoured before that move took place. However, it concurs that there is some evidence 
to suggest that the change in the RNZAFs combat role was influenced by changes in British 
policy in regard to fighters. 
In 1948 the Government approved a plan providing for two regular RNZAF bomber 
squadrons and one fighter/bomber squadron.8 In December 1950 the Cabinet Defence 
Committee endorsed another plan for the RNZAF that had been prepared in consultation 
with the British Chief of Air Staff, Lord Tedder.9 The intention was to field both Vampire 
fighters and Canberra bombers for service in the Middle East. Some aircraft, including 
Vampires, had already been ordered, but no decision had been made on the Canberra. 
Lord Tedder had recommended that the Air Force preserve its knowledge of bombing 
methods by buying Canberras, even though this would increase its number of types in 
service. 10 The Canberra was favoured because it was 'by far the best of its type in the 
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world and would be taken into service in the Royal Air Force in 1951 '. 11 The Prime 
Minister, Sidney Holland, expressed concern at the variety of roles included in the plan, and 
stated that 'It appeared that effort might be unduly clispersed at this time with a resultant 
loss of overall efficiency.' 12 He invited the CAS to consider whether it would be better to 
iimit the range ofRNZAF activities. Wniie some changes were made to the plan, the 
recommendation to purchase Canberras remained. 13 
In June 1951 the Chief of Air Staff informed the Defence Council that the Mosquito 
fightedoombers operated by the RNZAF were obsolete and could not be deployed 
operationally. 14 Maintaining these aircraft was costly and replacement was necessary. 
Therefore the RNZAF wished to re-equip with Canberras in 1952. 15 The CAS pointed out 
that the Canberra wouJd be the standard mediwn bomber in RAF service. Heavy demand 
for the aircraft meant that a delay of up to two years was expected, making it necessary to 
place an order as soon as possibie. The CAS said that Australia was also preparing to 
manufacture Canberras and recommended that consideration be given to supporting the 
Austraiian aircraft industry, despite the fact that Australian Canberras were expected to cost 
more than those of British origin. 
The Secretary to the Treasury acknowledged that new aircraft would be more capabie 
and more economical to operate, and recommended placing orders as soon as possible. 
However, Cabinet did not approve the purchase: it was anticipated that the cost of the new 
bombers would drop as mass production got underway, while demand meant that none 
would be available before 1954. 16 The RAF suggested that additional fighter/bombers 
would suffice as an interim measure. It would seem that the early enthusiasm for the 
Canberra was dampened by financial considerations. 
In February 1954, the Minister of Defence, T. L. Macdonald, said 'It cannot be denied 
that a more modem fighter aircraft must eventually replace the Vampire if New Zealand is 
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to maintain itself in a reasonable state of preparedness.' 17 In August he explained that the 
evaluation of aircraft to re-equip No. 75 Squadron would have to consider the plans of other 
Commonwealth air forces with which New Zealand might have to integrate. 18 However, 
progress on making such a decision seems to have stalled for almost two years. 
In February 1956 the CAS pointed out that the RNZAF did not have an aircraft capable 
of combating surface raiders, and recommended re-equipping one of the transport squadrons 
with light bombers for this purpose. 19 He explained that a medium-range transport 
squadron could be formed with civilian aircraft if war broke out, and argued that allies 
should provide long-range transports. This demonstrated the RNZAFs willingness to forgo 
other roles to acquire strike aircraft and particularly the prestigious Canberra. It also 
suggests that the role of the Canberra was not senled. On the other hand, perhaps the 
RNZAF beiieved that an argument based on maritime security and trade protection would 
be more likely to persuade Cabinet than pians for raids on distant enemy targets. 
ln May i 956 Cabinet considered a proposal to convert No 41 Squadron from transport 
a ircraft to Canberra bombers. 20 This recommendation was one of a number of urgent 
equipment requirements put forward by the three Services. The pian also provided for the 
purchase of new fighter aircraft to re-equip No 75 Squadron. No contending types were 
named, but planned expenditure was based on the cost of the Hawker Hunter. The Air 
Force was also considering re-equipping No 14 Squadron with Canberras, although this was 
not included in the proposal before Cabinet.21 Even after the switch to an emphasis on 
South East Asia in 1955, the RNZAF was clearly hoping to obtain both fighters and bombers 
to replace the existing day fighter/ground attack aircraft. In December 1956 it was reported 
that Air Commodore Eveleigh, the Assistant Chief ofth.e Air Staff, had referred to the 
possibility of New Zealand receiving Canberras as an 'open secret'.22 He pointed out that 
' how many, when, and even where' were still to be decided by the Cabinet Defence 
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Committee. Eveleigh also said that Canberras would ' put some more kick into SEATO, a 
thing we will have to do if we want to keep war away from New Zealand' . The CNS was 
said to support the acquisition of Canberras. 23 
During the 1957 Review of Defence it was proposed that the fighteriground attack roie 
be switched to light bomber/interdiction.24. It was argued that the new role would provide a 
more balanced Commonwealth force in South East Asia and give the RNZAF greater 
flexibility. The proposed change was seen as conforming with the ailied strategy in South 
East Asia, where plans called for air strikes on the Chinese mainland foilowed by 
interdiction missions against the Chinese army.25 The Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF) was 
re-equipping half of its day fighter/ground attack squadrons with Canberras to undertake 
such raids. The remaining units were to operate night fighters to protect the bomber bases, 
and the Chiefs of Staff ciaimed that New Zealand had to choose benveen these two roies. 
The Canberra was preferred because it could perform high-altitude bombing and low-level 
support, and it had a long range.26 The Canberra could also mount strikes from bases in 
Austraiia should aiiied forward defensive efforts fai l. 
The RAF was withdrawing its Venoms from the region, and these were the same aircraft 
that the RNZAF was operating in Malaya. A squadron of eight Canberras would cost 
approximately the same as a squadron of sixteen Venoms. Moreover, the RAF was wiiling 
to provide Canberras for use in Malaya for little more than the cost of hiring the Venoms.27 
Wright argued that the change in the combat role was influenced by Britain's 1957 
defence white paper, which had signaled the demise of the manned fighter. 28 Indeed, that 
year the British Minister of Defence told the New Zealand Cabinet that fighters were not 
considered a high priority because it was impossible to defend cities from nuclear attack. 29 
Therefore reducing the number of fighter aircraft would not greatly affect security. 
However, fighters were being maintained to protect bomber bases until more effective 
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surface to air missiles became available. The RNZAF had previously considered aircraft 
like the Hunter to replace the VampireNenom in the day fighter/ground attack role. 
However, the RAF was now re-equipping its day fighter/ground attack aircraft in the Far 
East with interdictors and night/all-weather fighters. New Zealand faced no air threat, so 
night/all-weather fighters were not required on national grounds. These fighters also lacked 
the versatility of the Canberra, which offered the RNZAF a much more flexible combat 
force. 
Filer argued that the RNZAF preferred the Canberra for reasons of prestige, despite the 
fact that fighters would be more useful in South East Asia?' However, fighters were 
considered less important in aHied plans for operations in South East Asia at that time. 
Fighters operating in the close support role might have been adequate in counter-insurgency 
e fforts, but defence planners were focused on the potential for iarger conflicts. The Chiefs 
of Staff rated limited war with China a distinct possibility in 1957, and New Zealand 's allies 
believed that nuclear strikes and interdiction missions would be essential to slow the 
advance of the enormous Chinese army? Thus the Canberras were intended to assist 
operations on the ground even though they were to fly interdiction missions rather than 
close support. The RNZAFs emphasis on a light bomberiinterdictor was also consistent 
with SEA TO strategy. 
The decision not to acquire new fighters also fitted with the Government's 
unwillingness to expand the RNZAF' s combat force. The Air Force had planned to equip 
two squadrons with Canberras and one with day fighter/ground attack aircraft. However, 
Cabinet did not approve the proposal to convert No 41 Squadron, leaving the RNZAF with 
only two combat squadrons. At the same time, the day fighter/ground attack role seemed to 
have vanished from the FEAF, so it made sense to press ahead with plans to equip with 
Canberras only. If Cabinet objected to the re-equipment of No 4l Squadron because of the 
11 
cost involved, it is likely that financial constraints influenced the decision not to acquire 
new fighters. 
The RNZAF thus wanted to hire Canberras to equip No 14 and purchase Canberras for 
No 75 Squadron.32 Fourteen aircraft would be required for service in New Zealand, and 
they were expected to remain in front-line use until 1965. With the arrival of the Canberra, 
the Vampires would be used for training. The RNZAF believed that re-equipment in other 
roles could be deferred to accommodate this purchase, a further indication of the high 
priority that the Air Force accorded combat aircraft. 
The 1957 Defence Review, tabied in June, announced the change in the combat role and 
stated that the Vampires and Venoms would eventually be replaced with Canberras.33 A 
Cabinet Minister, Tom Shand, told the House that ' The Canberra bomber is undoubtedly the 
best close support aircraft in existence today, and especially valuable because it can fly from 
New Zealand to the theatre of operations, something which is not possibie with fighter type 
aircraft. ·34 Philip Holloway, a Labour MP, supported the change in the combat role, saying 
that ' it seems commonsense to use a striking force rather than an interceptor force'_ :u 
The Cabinet Defence Committee had noted that the recommendation to order Canberras 
was a matter of urgency.36 In June Cabinet di scussed the proposed purchase and agreed 
that Britain should be approached to secure the best financial terms. 37 In July the Minister 
of Defence sought Cabinet approval for the purchase of fourteen Canberras to equip No 75 
Squadron. 38 The Canberra was recommended because it could operate in both the 
bomberiinterdictor and close support roles. It possessed high performance, long range, ease 
of maintenance and acceptable runway requirements. The aircraft was operated by a 
number of air forces and was expected to have a considerable service life. It was rated as 
the most cost-effective option to re-equip the RNZAF, and gave New Zealand the means to 
deploy nuclear weapons. 
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The Air Board had selected the B(I) 8 Canberra produced in Britain, rather than the B 20 
manufactured in Australia. The Australian aircraft did not meet the operational 
requirements of the RNZAF, and cost approximately twice as much as the more advanced 
B(I) 8. Furthermore, the short production run in Australia would necessitate a costly 
arrangement for life-of-type spares and attrition aircraft. Although the RNZAF had 
previously been wi1ling io consider paying a higher price to support Austraiia's defence 
industry, it is doubtful that they ever envisaged paying twice as much. The British variant 
was to remain in production for some time, which would allow costs to be spread. The 
choice would also aliow the RNZAF to benefit from an integrated provisioning scheme in 
place with the RAF that provided further economies and a proven source of supply. 
Treasury did not contest the choice of the Canberra or the need for re-equipment. They 
did suggest that if crev,,s were trained by the RAF fewer tTaining aircraft wouid be required 
in New Zealand. The RNZAF, no doubt anxious to secure an order as soon as possible, 
agreed to reduce the number requested to eleven. 
in July, the Minister of Defence recommended to Cabinet the purchase of eleven 
Canberras.39 The British Air Ministry had stated that delivery could commence in 
September i 958 provided that an order was placed that month. The Minister noted that 
delay could lead to greater operating costs for the Venoms once the RAF had re-equipped. 
Postponement could also result in a higher purchase price. 
Doubts about the acquisition of Canberras were expressed privately by members of the 
External Affairs Department. In March 1956, Frank Corner questioned how the Canberras 
wouJd fit into the concept of a single, unified defence force. He told Alister McIntosh that 
'I slightly mistrust the U.K. pushing us into Canberras but know almost nothing about it. ' 40 
McIntosh wrote that he was 'very doubtful about the Canberras but cannot cJarify my doubts 
or produce worthwhile objections to experts'. 41 
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These doubts are significant, especially in the case of McIntosh as he frequently 
attended meetings of the Cabinet Defence Committee. Some of their concerns related to 
the correct balance of forces. Corner in particular favoured a more unified defence force 
and suggested that the RNZAF shouid focus on supporting the Army. Conversely, the 
bomber/interdictor role would allow the Air Force a greater degree of independence from 
the other Services. There were also questions about the I ikelihood of the kind of war in 
Asia that would require such air strikes. 
it is also clear from this correspondence that there was strong resistance within the 
Government to spending on the military. McIntosh told Foss Shanahan that the Deputy 
Prime Minister, Keith Holyoake ' doesn ' t like defence, and he has been even more 
detennined than the Prime Minister to ensure that the Defence Fund is used up for other 
purposes, as, in fact, it has been largely used up' .42 He also stated that ' Relations between 
the P.M. and Mr Macdonald have been very bad for some time, and, on this defence issue, 
we could do nothing \\~th him at ali. As I told you last week, the decision on Canberras 
was only brought about as a resuit of a question asked by Mathison, [ an Opposition MP] 
obviously drafted by the press. ' 43 
Mathison's question had been prompted by comments attributed to the Australian 
Minister of Supply and Defence Production, Howard Beale. He had visited New Zealand 
for discussions on defence production and procurement and was subsequently interviewed 
by the Melbourne Herald. Beale was quoted as saying that 'It is expected that an 
arrangement will be made for the Australian aircraft industry to service and modify the 
Canberra jet bombers which the New Zealand Government has purchased from the United 
Kingdom Government. ' 44 This was before Cabinet had approved the purchase. The 
Australian correspondent reported that Beale had not visited Wellington with the intention 
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of selling Australian-manufactured Sabre fighters as he already knew that New Zealand had 
decided to purchase Canberras on special terms from the United Kingdom. 
Mathison asked the Prime Minister to confirm that the RNZAF would be re-equipped 
with Canberras. On 9 August, the Minister of Defence answered that ' in the New Zealand 
White Paper it was stated that the RNZAF would be re-equipped with Canberra aircraft. 
Those for the squadron in New Zealand are being purchased in the United Kingdom. The 
terms are not yet finalised. '45 He also explained that the squadron in Malaya would operate 
hired Canberras. It would seem that the embarrassing question from Mathison forced the 
Government to make a decision. On 14 August 1957 Cabinet approved the purchase of l 1 
" ( Canberras."' 
The RNZAF"s desire to obtain the Canberra preceded any questions over the 
replacement of the Vampire. While the purchase of bombers marked a change in the 
combat role of the Air Force, this occurred because of the decision not to acquire new 
fighters which was in turn due to a beiief that the age of the manned fighter was drawing to 
a ciose. Nor does it seem that the wish to purchase Canberras was affected by the change 
in commitments from the Middle East to South East Asia. The willingness to forgo other 
roles for the sake of the Canberra demonstrated the importance of strike aircraft to Air Force 
planners. Filer argued that the RNZAF wanted the Canberra for reasons of prestige, and to 
some extent that is true.47 Combat aircraft were considered essential to the RNZAF's 
identity as a fighting Service. Modern aircraft were also necessary to maintain morale and 
attract recruits. The prestige of the Canberra was important for these reasons, but it would 
be unfair to say that the Air Force wanted Canberras solely for reasons of prestige. RNZAF 
planners, like their SEA TO allies, believed that Canberras would be required to fight a 
limited war in South East Asia. 
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The Canberra purchase also highlighted the increasing importance of financial 
considerations, over and above military concerns. These restrictions delayed for several 
years a purchase that the RNZAF considered urgent. The Government was reluctant to 
approve the purchase of Canberras even after an undertaking to do so had been published in 
the 1957 White Paper. This was despite the absence of any serious challenge to the 
proposal from Treasury. The desire to iimit defence spending that was beginning to emerge 
would have more serious repercussions in the years that followed. 
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